Here's a great conversation between two knowledgeable people on the situation in Europe. Note that a few days ago on Thinker's Forum, Jeffrey Sachs said that WW-I and WW-II were actually two European civil wars. Yet their colonies keep getting dragged into the conflicts between the Warring Tribe of Europe, and some FOOLS gave them nuclear weapons? What could go wrong?
PASCAL- Welcome back everybody to Neutrality Studies today for an update with the always brilliant Commodore Steve Jermy, a retired captain of the British Navy. Steve, welcome back.
STEVE- It's good to be here, Pascal. I say this so often that they say you should live in interesting times and my goodness be, don't we live in interesting times?
PASCAL- We do. I mean for whatever it is and everybody watching this knows, I'm not a great fan of how politics is going, but it is not boring. And one of the things that you've now started that we want to talk about is this here. You started a petition in Britain to pause British military support for Ukraine. Steve, what is this about?
[Big section about the petition]
PASCAL- The propaganda is insane and it is pro-war propaganda and it is pro-weapons propaganda. So what we need to do is counter propaganda in order to actually spread the news that there's people who oppose this insanity. STEVE- One of them [my Substack articles] was on the coming war with Russia. And in the coming war with Russia, I finished off that article by saying that we needed to have a public debate about this because the risks to Britain, the risk to Europe, I mean, the risk to the world of a of an extending war from Russia into NATO, which is by no means impossible. Indeed, I would say is about 50/50 at the moment, I'm afraid to say. But the risks are huge, you know, they're sort of, they would lead into as I said in the article, in the West, if the Russians were to respond to an attack for example on a Kaliningrad or you know, some sort of exchange, then in the event of some sort of exchange between NATO and Russia, then we can't defend ourselves against Russian hypersonic and conventionally armed ballistic missiles and just look at what's happening to Ukraine to work out what could happen to Europe.
So, it seemed to me that the government is leading us into these potential wars. And as you say, very much in a "we'll stand by Ukraine, whatever it takes, will provide the weapons that they need," which of course is simply upping the ante with Russia and increasing I think the chance that the Russians could preempt us. I don't know whether they will. I think probably not. But in terms of probability, the fact that they might, or the fact that we might have some sort of Guns of August, which of course is Barbara Tuchman's discussion of how Europe fell into a war in 1914, and look at the consequences of that. And I think the consequences would be worse than 1914, Pascal, because of the weapons that the Russians could deploy.
PASCAL- Which is why it's so bizarre that, you know, at a moment when Europe and the United States combined lack the ability to produce the implements of war that would be needed in order to even have a chance at a war like that, in that moment, the rhetoric is still being ratcheted up and I mean that Britain has nuclear weapons, Britain still has a has armed forces. I mean it's not as if though Britain is completely disarmed but it is not, I mean compared to what Russia has, and especially after four years of war and the whole idea I think of the NATO cloud was that this would, you know, disarm Russia because it would come out with less arms but the opposite happened. They are much more resilient than we thought or in Nicolas Taleb's words "antifragile" and they came out stronger or they're coming out stronger from this. Why do you think that it is, that even now, there is still this British and general European, actually, like rabid Russophobia still leading to this military talk or the talk of war against Russia instead of well, we need to figure out a way to live with the Russians. We're still not there. STEVE- No. I think there are a number of reasons for that. And there are a number of people with different sort of theories, but it's probably a combination of things. But I think that the way that I've described this before is that Europe and NATO and the West are operating to a political narrative which is how they guide their operations, whereas the Russians are operating according to a military strategy and as a writer on stretch I can tell you I'd much rather have a military strategy than a political narrative because the narrative is changing all the time and I think what's happened is that the way that the narrative has been formed and because of the modern approaches with spin in particular which is very much a 21st-Century phenomena, you know, the presentation of views and advice and information to the populations in a way which actually improves the sort of people's view, of the people in power.
And unfortunately what that means is that the information is often provided in a very, to me, a deceptive way. I'm not sure if it's deliberately deceptive, but if you're providing information only which supports the government narrative and keeping from people the information which does the reverse, then of course the population tend to be propagandized and as you say I'm afraid to say as well, I think that that this propagandization is quite wide. I was at a lunch only on Saturday with some former naval commanding officers and we got on to this subject and I, in the past, I found that almost everybody's anti-Putin, anti-Russia. There's more open-mindedness now, but certainly one or two of them were still along the lines of well, Putin is obviously an evil man. He's obviously going to invade the rest of Russia Europe. So the rest of Europe and when I say there's no evidence for that, you know people push back and say well, it's obvious that he is, I say that's an opinion it's not evidence - everything that he has said, nothing that Putin has said says anything other than the opposite, and I always say to people, why would Putin want to invade the rest of Europe, you know, our economies are in poor shape there are social unrest, just look at France, so for a whole load of reasons, so I think that the short answer is that we've got into, thanks to propaganda, a form of cult thinking - a form of thinking, where everybody's on board and anybody who dares dissent is treated as a sort of an outsider or a dissenter. We have a program in Britain called Politics Sunday {across the UK} I think it's called. Anyway, it's quite a popular program. I listened to it yesterday.
There was not a single voice which came at the issues from anything other than the Western political narrative. It included people such as the editor of the Financial Times who you would have thought would have been more open-minded. She's British-Lebanese. But it's very widespread and it sort of it makes me think of cult thinking because whenever people are subject or have fallen into cult thinking then whenever they get a bit of evidence that that suggests that they're wrong they simply rationalize it in a strange way as the cult does, it sort of brings back another, you see this as well in markets and economics, you know, the famous book on this is the Madness of Crowds, so I think that's my explanation, Pascal, but for you as a Swiss national, you've been close to this as well and I'd be curious to see what you think.
PASCAL- No, it's I mean, cult thinking is one of them. The propaganda is of course one but, you know, the structure we in political science, we also call it path dependence, right, what's happening tomorrow is determined by what happens today and so on. So the bounce of the possible is not as wide as we would like it to be in terms of like what's possible for change. And we've seen that in Switzerland actually, relatively recently. You know, you have petitions in the in the UK - we have these other two instruments. One of them is called the Initiative, right. We can draft a piece of an amendment to the constitution, actually hand it to the chancellery. The chancellor will then give us 18 months and if within 18 months we gather 100,000 signatures, it will be a mandatory referendum and not want that. Not just go to parliament as in, could you discuss please, but as in everybody vote on this, and if it's accepted, it will become part of the constitution. So it's that's the direct democratic model and it's also a way to constantly threaten parliament and the executive to say like, hey guys if we really are opposed to stuff we can do something and there was this initiative to create foreign neutrality right, and we were working on this for four years I was not an initiator but I was like you, as a porter from the an early moment and we lost it crushingly, 30% yes 70% No, because the other side was convincingly able to make it a referendum about Putin. Do you like Putin? Yes or No? Or do you do you support sanctions on Russia? Yes or No? And the sad answer is 70% re support sanctions. But based upon this Russophobic narrative.
So sorry, long story short, this is still one of the one of the things that's going on, you know, because the narrative is very strong. It's very entrenched and Switzerland is part and parcel of the European narrative structure. But what fascinates me and I would like to know your opinion on, is the Russians pay very much attention to the narratives in the West. I think at the beginning they brushed them off a bit but by now they take them very serious. So there was this show just a couple two weeks ago, right, in the UK where the war game show, where they had a couple of former politicians play through a war game and they simulate the idea that there would be an attack on the UK and what the UK would do and one of the answers was well we will take Kaliningrad and the Russians reacted very, very ferociously to that TV show. It's a TV show, but one of the people on there was former NATO head what's his name? The Norwegian guy. Stoltenberg.
STEVE- Stoltenberg.
PASCAL-Right. So, they had former politicians, right? What do you make out of that? Because this tells me the Russians keep watching the narrative very closely.
STEVE- Well, I think they've been watching from the very start of this SMO and indeed before the start of the SMO, but I think actually it's becoming more acute now because actually as we're getting towards what I think is probably the later stages of the Russia-Ukraine war then I think tensions are rising. So I can imagine that there are, particularly I would be if I were in their situation, I think I know that program you're talk you're talking about I didn't actually listen to it, but I what interests me is the fact that they were indeed talking about Kaliningrad because I wrote an article I think I mentioned before, called the coming war with Russia and in it I hypothesize that the Russians rather than wait for us to get to 2030 when we're ready for war apparently, I doubt that we could ever be ready for war, but rather they actually preemptively attack.
But actually, I now think there's an even more plausible scenario. I'm sorry, I argue they preemptively attack the drone making and missile making facilities in the West, particularly those in Britain, France, and Germany. But I think an even more plausible scenario now, Pascal, is that actually as the crisis begins to actually intensify, and I think there is a crisis now arriving in Kiev, because of Russians progress on the battlefield, but also their complete domination of the air and the complete inability of the Ukrainians and with[out] European, American weapons to defend themselves from the air. I think we're getting closer to the to the war's conclusion. There was a visit, I think last week, wasn't it, with included something like 30 generals from across NATO, that tells me that they're worried. And one of the things that I've thought is that as we get to this moment, then what they could do is they could look at Kaliningrad and say, "Well, if we take Kaliningrad, we've then got a bargaining chip to force the Russians to the table." it would be an imbecilic thing to do. but I'm afraid to say that I've forecast in the past that people's wouldn't people wouldn't do imbecilic thing, and they've done them. So I think it's not impossible. I think if they were to take Kaliningrad, then I think the Russians would devastate whichever forces did it. I think though that to come back to the key point of your question, I think we really do need to understand that the Russians are listening to us and what they're hearing is very bellicose and it's very determined to keep going, whatever the cost, whatever the cost to Ukrainians, and you know we heard recently the British prime minister say that as indeed did his predecessor, and his predecessor before that, that will support Ukraine for as long as it takes. And you know, we've seen the sort of forms of escalation with the delivery of weapons that we didn't think that would be provided by the West to Ukraine, but indeed they were provided.
So, you know, I'm sort of looking in the Russian situation. I think it matters and I think it's about time that we started to do, I say "we" - I mean we in the Western population, we in the western press, we in the western governments, start to do what you and I and so many others in the independent media do, which is to listen to Russia. And that's point I made time and time again. If you listen to Russia then you'd have a much better understanding of the nature of the war and people don't understand the nature of the war. I think time and again I see discussion with Western politicians saying we need to get Russians back to the negotiating table which tells me that they see this as a sort of negotiation but with weapons.
That's not how the Russians see it. The Russians see this as an existential war in which their ultimate security is at threat. You know they've seen things such as the RAND study back in 2018, I think it was, about the breakup of Russia and what that might look like, you know, and here we are sort of, you know, nearly eight years on, with what they would interpret as an attempt to do that, it to me, it's this sort of unwillingness to listen to Russia. I mean I'm listening, I'm reading at the moment Jonathan Haslam's book which is a called "Hubris" and the origins of the Russia Ukraine war.
Jonathan Haslam is one of the world's best Russian experts. He was one of my lecturers at Cambridge and a Russian specialist then and although I don't share completely his views, but the path was absolutely clear and there were very, very many people warned against it but there was warning against it but there was this sort of determination, a willful determination to ignore the warnings of some of the brightest people in the West and Russia and continue to push with NATO expansion and surprise, surprise - surprisingly we are. PASCAL- Yeah, that's the problem to me. You know, it's not as if though we didn't know that the Russians take things extremely seriously and we had the leaks, right? The 2008 or nine, 2008 memo of William Burns when he was ambassador, US ambassador to Moscow and he wrote back, look Ukraine is the brightest of all of all red lines and there was so many and then again like you have that, and then you have the other side that knows about that and they actively proactively work toward that. They work toward this kind of provocation.
And the problem that I have is that I also have a track record of misreading the Russians, right? I belong to the people in February 2022 who said nonsense. This Russia is not going to attack Ukraine. They wouldn't do that. It will hurt them much, way too much, you know, there's all of these fraternal ties and all of these families that that go together. This would be an absolutely horrible war. It would be a civil war. They will not do it. And so did Ambassador Jack Matlock and others and Anatoli even and we were wrong. The other one I remember very clearly is, you know, when this whole idea came up that there are Korean, North Korean soldiers fighting. I belong to the people who called it bullshit and said like, no this is just another like stupid propaganda move. Well turns out there are North Koreans actually and they even fire missiles. It's like, okay, okay, I'm wrong. I'm wrong. And but the point is, I underestimate like certainly also some of the politics that's going on with Russia, Russia and North Korea actually came much closer together. And the other thing is I seriously underestimated, just the sheer situation in the Donbas and how that became an intolerable thing and the entire militarization of Ukraine. How utterly intolerable that became to the leadership to the point where I still think that they made a miscalculation thinking that they could like scare the Ukrainians into a deal, right? An agreement, which almost succeeded. No, almost. Yeah.
But the moment Britain made sure that that didn't happen, that's the moment when they caught them in that horrible slaughter and meat grinder and the Russians have been trying to work themselves out of that for the last three years. So in this sense, or four years, sorry. Miscalculations happen on all sides and that makes it unpredictable, doesn't it?
STEVE- No, definitely. Like you I mean I was working in the energy sector until till the middle of this year at the time and I wasn't following it closely. So when the war kicked off I had not anticipated it. But after I'd done, it didn't take me long to think well, this obviously isn't an invasion to take Ukraine because there weren't enough troops. It was just mathematically obvious. I think, you know, we the people talk about 190,000 I think the effects of combat forces were about 90,000 together with the militia in in the Donbas but the way I characterize it now, was that was essentially as you say, it was what I would call the military use, the use of military force in support of a diplomatic initiative. So the aim was to bring Ukraine to the negotiation table and to demonstrate to the West that when they said this was a red line, this was a red line and that it almost worked. I mean what they wanted of course, was they wanted self-determination for the Donbas. They wanted neutrality for Ukraine and they wanted no membership of NATO. I mean the Europeans would bite Russia's hand off for that now.
So but I think that to me, I think they were so close and had it not been for Boris Johnson and those who were supporting him, I have a strong sense that that the British chief of defense staff at the time had a strong role in this. I've heard him talk about it subsequently online about how it was the right thing to do. I mean, to respond in the way that they did. I think that, you know, then we get into the whole strategy and I think that the Russians have been very pragmatic and deliberate about it. I guess the question and it is an open question which is a one that will always arise is what else could Putin have done and I don't know the answer to that but you're right on the Donbas. I recently watched with my wife the film by Ann Marie Barone, I want to say, I can't remember her name but she's French author who did a one-hour video, a one-hour program on the Donbas in 2015 and I was quite shocked how bad things were and I knew about the numbers of casualties and I knew that the OSCE, their reports on how, you know, that there was significant pressure being put on the ethnic Russians in the Donbas. So we also knew that when the Russian military did arrive that the first message they got from the Donbas, the ethnic Russians in the Donbas was, what took you so long, you know, so to me it may have been a mistake although I find it difficult to think what else I would have done in Putin's shoes. I don't know, I mean they had offered that in December in December of 2021, a treaty which sort of sets it all out and you get to the stage, well what more can we do. But no, I think that the problem though is that so little of this is understood by anybody who isn't paying the attention that people like you and I and the listeners to programs or to podcasts such as yours and our other colleagues in the independent media, Pascal.
We've got a Western, I would say a European population, who are very, very still very propagandized. I think it's less so in the United States although I think that's to do a lot to do with isolationism. People don't want to be involved in this other war and the neocons are the ones who would push for their own reasons. There may be others. There may be a sort of Zionist link. It's difficult to say, but as far as I can see, you know, the Americans want out. So, you know, the sooner they can get out, the better, and from the basis of the recent exchange between Zelensky and Donald Trump, I suspect that that exit from the Americans may be even closer based on their discussions about diesel, although that's a separate subject.
PASCAL- Yeah, I'll believe that one once the Americans stop the intelligence sharing, before they don't switch off Starlink and don't switch off, you know, all of this kind of like the targeting and so on and don't rein the CIA from the front line.
I don't take anything for real that's coming from there. And I don't, I honestly I don't think the Russians do either, because what we know by now also from the trip that Mearsheimer did to Russia, is that the last big test on what the Trump administration could do was Anchorage and the fact that Trump could not deliver or didn't want to deliver or didn't, or just used it as a ruse. I think the Russia just drove the point home that well, no they're not doing, they're either incapable of doing it or not serious about it but it both leads to the same end which is like the United States is not going to rein in their own war hawks.
STEVE- Yeah. Yeah. I think that's right. I think again the problem with the beltway and within the beltway, there are so many different factions within the beltway, and you know, we talk about the neocons but even within the neocons, yeah it's complicated. So I think I can see why the Russians now believe that the Americans not agreement-capable, especially I mean, just look at the Strait of Hormuz and the MoU you know the Americans have drawn back from that so that's why I think that this is going to be settled on the battlefield and I think it's closer to being settled on the battlefield as well. I think that the Ukraine's made the mistake of attacks in the Sea of Azov and attacks on other Russian infrastructure.
People say, well, Russia have just escalated in response as if it's a sort of ping-pong. I don't quite see it like that. I what I see it is that if the Ukrainians do things such as these attacks, then the Russians, when they do come back, they're doing something which we used to call the [in] military, their rules of engagement. So they're making their rules of engagement more open to more intensive attacks. So at the moment they're doing, I think, seeking to isolate Kiev. I think that it's not impossible. I don't think it's their main focus, but it's not impossible that they would move on Kiev when I think the main focus is to get past the last of the fortress cities and then they've got a pretty much open territory running all the way through Dnieper River. They're also seem to be fielding some quite interesting anti-drone technologies. And again, if you want to be moving more at speed, then you want to be moving with your local air defense, your point air defense with your formations so that you can move safely and defend yourself against drones.
So to me, I'm expecting them to when they get to the Dnieper River, I'm assuming that well, I don't know whether they'll do it this year, but I'd be surprised if they haven't done it by the by early next year. When they get to the new year then the open question is how they, whether they consolidate there and start to build a second Sirovikin Line or whether they actually continue to actually secure the whole of Novorossyia, I think, to go back to Kiev. I think the interesting thing in Kiev, if I were in Putin's shoes, I would be thinking very seriously about a move on Kiev and I wouldn't be doing it because I wanted ultimately to hold Kiev, although I think Kiev was originally a Russian city. I'd be doing it to for political reasons to dislodge the government and to show to the West what was actually happening because, it would be impossible for the West to say that Russia is losing if people are, if diplomats and the Ukrainian government are leaving Kiev in the same way that we saw the Americans leave Saigon and NATO and the Americans leave Kabul. At that stage, you know, the war is over. That's why I do I'm sensitive to those [NATO] generals visiting because I suspect that they can see that this may not be far away. We'll see. But if I were in Putin shoes, I'd be thinking about it very seriously. Again, I wouldn't want to retain Kiev, but actually moving on it in the way where actually people had to abandon it. I mean, [Mayor] Klitschko is already asking the civilian population to leave. So to abandon it would be what I'd be thinking about. That would make it impossible, I think, for anybody in Europe to say that the Russians are losing.
PASCAL- It would, but you know, I'm more afraid of the ingenuity of these PR people of what they could come up with next in, you know, I mean, depending on who wins the day over there in the in the PR department, I mean, the next thing might be we have now to send troops to defend Kiev or to reconquer Kiev, you know, the second re-conquest on the East. It's like stupid stuff like that. But then again, if they did that, they would actually start committing NATO troops, and that's the one thing they wanted to avoid like the plague until now, at least for the official narrative. Overall, for like expanding the Ukraine war into Europe, what you actually would need is a second front like something in the Baltics, which is why again like Kaliningrad is so dangerous, right? Because it is actually an exposed part of Russia and the Russians are very adamant that saying like, you know, this is a fortress city and we will defend it, but you know, matter of the fact, is it is an exposed territory and NATO could think about stuff like that but then again they don't want that, they want to provoke the Russians so I cannot exactly see how what they would do but something like direct strikes from Estonia while denying it or something like this, I don't know, it's hope, this is not the stuff that is actually being planned, although I'm pretty sure they do.
STEVE- Yeah. No, I think that's right. I mean, I think the my guess is that although you know, we've heard one or two American generals say we could take [it] easily, I don't think nearly as easy as that. I'm speaking as an ex-air defender. I commanded an air defense destroyer and I know how difficult the air battle is. And at the moment actually you would be going into that sort of an invasion of Kaliningrad with, I would be extremely nervous about committing troops into that because, I would be working on the base of if I committed troops into that then as soon as the Russians were aware where they were, they'd be wiped out. You imagine a Oreshnik, you know I imagine a Orsehnik/core headquarters and you this would need to be at least a core level operation, imagine a core headquarters being hit by an Oreshnik, you know, all taken out completely - there's no defense against the region so unless they can sort of maintain complete secrecy which I would say is almost impossible with modern day systems you would be looking at losing using significant amounts of Western troops and we're talking tens of thousands of troops I think, not just in the thousands and I look back on Afghanistan and I think in the British loss in Afghanistan just over 450 over 20 years the Americans lost just over 2,000 and those were losses which where people were very sensitive to, we'd be losing those sorts of figures of people in the first day and I just don't think that anybody in Europe is ready for that level of people killed in action so I would like to think that that prospect would be enough to make people think again which again is why we've got to have the debate because people aren't saying these things.
They're not talking about, you know, the number of, you know, British and French and German and Latvian and so on, troops killed in action. Yeah. we would be going up against what I would say is the is the most battle hardened army in the world with four years of experience and the equipment the doctrine, the reserves, and even the reserves are being cycled through in a way which makes very good military sense, so you know, I can't think of anything worse really I mean I don't see from what I can see, I look a little bit across the Western forces, but we're not ready. You know Britain isn't even spending at the moment. We've just sort of put on hold our increase to even 3% by 2030. So and we won't be alone. I think Poland are the ones who are spending most. So without the money and it's not just without the money that it's also without the sense in the population of this is a right cause. Now, at the moment, some will, but most people I talked to in this country, I've seen things on LinkedIn where people say, "Well, don't want to fight for my country given the way that I've been treated." So, there's a lot of internal dissent. So, and I don't think we're at all unusual. I think the Germans, I think I heard, were wanting to increase their army about 100,000 and they've got about, of the volunteers that they request, they've got about 250.
It's a tiny figure and people are, you know, the young in the West and with very good reason, I don't think really are the slightest bit interested, you may have seen Tucker Carlson talking to a British politician called Jacob Reese Mogg who's pontificating about how we should all be prepared to make a sacrifice. I looked at the comments after that there, was not one single comment supporting Jacob Reese, not one, everyone without exception was very negative about it and very negative about the idea of doing your duty is which is how mob was presenting it. So I don't know what you think. I don't know what it's like in Switzerland, but we're not really...
PASCAL- I mean Switzerland is the same like, you know, the war hawks in Switzerland exist there too. All of them without exception they want to be Winston Churchill. The point is none of them wants to be Private Ryan. So, and that's the thing. They want others to be Private Ryan while they play Winston Churchill. and you know that's the thing that gives me hope, is that at the moment, the resistance to that, especially from the younger generation is there, as no, we are not going to die for this, this stupid stuff, which is why I am actually afraid that the people who are seriously game-planning this must be thinking that what Europe needs is a Pearl Harbor moment right, I mean you needed literally to bomb the Americans out of their neutrality in the Second World War and into the war and Pearl Harbor did the trick, now question there, that was a real attack. No question. But it was the thing that was the psychological breakthrough. And we know from other wars including Vietnam War, with the Gulf of Tonkin and we know from other things like Saddam Hussein's "weapons of mass destruction" and on and on and on, that false flag attacks and false claim can sometimes do the trick in order to sway the population. So I do hope that there won't be any such kind of nefarious affair going on.
STEVE- Yeah. I hope as well, Pascal, I think the $64,000 question as well for those who might be thinking about this, might be thinking about how we turn this into a NATO v Russia war, which of course is what Ukraine wants because it's the only way, the only way that NATO could, that Ukraine could have any chance. I happen to think it's even with NATO on board, it won't make any difference. But the $64,000 question is what will the Americans do? And I've got this strong view and it seems to be generally supported. The Americans have got no interest whatsoever in deploying United States forces to this campaign. And without the United States forces, the idea that the Europeans can do it is it's pathetic. And as I look at the, take the British armed forces, they're a shadow of what they were 20 years ago. You know, just take ships at the moment, we've got 11 destroyers and frigates. When I was serving, just after the Falklands War, we had over 70, you know, so it'll be the same across all of the armed forces.
And of course the other thing of course is that we've expended so much of our ammunition by giving it to Ukraine and in America's case, to Israel and to Saudis and others and it actually turns out that our equipment isn't actually very good. We could see that in the air defense. So, the danger is and I worry about this, the danger is that those people who are very much political without really understanding the logistics of war may, nevertheless continue down the neocon-type approach and say, no well, when we do this and get this war happening then it will keep Russia fixed, and it will allow us to, you know, allow us to further extend Russia but the people who will suffer in addition to the Ukrainians - the European peoples. So, you know, those people, the populations, it's not only the young people who'd be asked to go and fight, but it's also the mothers the daughters, the brothers and sisters of those who will be killed in action. They need to have a voice as well because none of this needs to happen. All we need is a bit of clear strategic thinking from the West which sadly, there's a sort of almost universal lack across the western political leadership I think.
PASCAL- Yeah I know there is but, you're also right on that, on the side that, you know, the commitment that an all-out war would mean also on the side of the Americans would be huge and you know we still have the American trip wire all over NATO, right? Including in all the Baltic States. You couldn't actually fight a war with the Baltic States, I mean without killing US service members because they're right there, so and that means that, you know, any kind of decision to go to do an all-out NATO/Russia war would need the commitment to sacrifice US troops and that's something that the United States has shown us even now with Iran that they are highly, highly unwilling to do which is why Ukraine was so important, right, it was very important that it was an obedient NATO proxy without being inside NATO because you know, you not only [have] plausible deniability but you didn't have to sacrifice your own troops outwardly with the others, you would have to. So there is a certain constraint in the system built in. But if we ever hear about troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe, from the United States, that's when I would think that they would get the countries ready, but we haven't heard that yet.
STEVE- Yeah. Yeah. I mean, I welcome the idea of the Americans going back to the United States. I mean, I think that it's about time Europe looked after itself. We're completely capable of it. We've got reasonably, we're not as rich as we were. We've got very many other things to deal with. But I think that the time has come and gone. You know NATO has passed itself by date, as I often say, if NATO couldn't win in 20 years in Afghanistan against a tribes armed with AK-47s and IEDs, how on earth do we think that NATO could win against the world's most battle-hardened army in the world with a unified force structure, unified logistic system, unified doctrine, whereas we've got, you know, 30 plus nations with different equipment, different training standards, a lot but you know...
PASCAL- I would find it a really good idea if the Europeans started thinking about defense, you know, instead of constantly trying to threaten Russia - how about just saying like: But Russia, let's be friends again and we will still have our armies, but we will not do any kind of this long range missile system stuff business anymore. We stop threatening you. How about we get we get back together? And I think that's part and parcel of the idea actually that you're bringing up, in pausing at least these weapons exports to Ukraine. So just in in in in closing, can you tell again everybody where to go to sign this and what you need to be I mean you need to be you need to have a British passport in order to do that, right?
[more talk about the UK petition]
PASCAL- Commodore Steve Jeremy, thank you so much for your time today.
STEVE- Yeah, it's a pleasure. Pascal, keep let's keep up the good work.
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